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 Opposition Parties in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
By 
 
Lise Rakner and Nicolas van de Walle 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper argues that the scholarship on democracy in Africa has paid insufficient 
attention to the nature of opposition parties. It first examines opposition parties in 
contemporary Africa, studying trends in electoral composition and legislative politics. 
The paper then links informal and formal institutions, focusing on opposition parties and 
on the factors that may explain the strength and weaknesses of opposition parties across 
the region in recent years. The authors suggest a weak or even non-existent relationship 
between level of democratic institutionalization and the size of opposition parties across 
the region. Comparative and case analyses of sub-Saharan African elections confirm the 
weakness of opposition parties in Africa as a striking characteristic of the multi-party 
systems in the region. 
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 Opposition Parties in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Introduction 
The scholarly literature on political parties in Sub Saharan Africa is entering a third phase 
that is likely to be theoretically rewarding, particularly if certain empirical quandaries can 
be resolved.  A first phase of interest in political parties in Africa occurred right around 
independence, in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Coleman and Rosberg 1964, 
Morgenthau 1964, Apter 1965, Hodgkins 1961). Influenced both by Leninist ideas 
placing political parties at the center of nation building and by the sheer romance of the 
moment, scholars initially hypothesized that the political parties emerging during the 
independence process were a modern vanguard that would spearhead the process of 
modernization through their mobilizational capabilities.  This early phase was then 
considerably tempered by scholars like Sklar (1963) Zolberg (1964, 1966), and Bienen 
(1967, 1971), whose field work led them to very different conclusions, not least because 
they were in the field just as fledgling democracies all through the continent were dying 
and single parties were consolidating their monopoly on power.  Rereading this literature 
today, one is struck by how little attention these scholars devoted to the legislatures or to 
the dynamics of legislative party systems, no doubt in large part because opposition 
parties were in the process of being eviscerated in one manner or another, and real 
effective power was moving rapidly away from the legislature into the presidency. 
 
By the mid 1970s, only Botswana, the Gambia and Mauritius could claim an even 
modestly competitive party system. The subsequent consolidation of the single party, and 
a plethora of military regimes led scholars away from African parties, and, with the odd 
exception (Widner 1992), to an almost total neglect of the topic for most of the 1970s and 
1980s.  The second phase of interest in African political parties had to wait for the wave 
of democratization that restored multi-party politics to the region in the 1990s.  Since 
then, a number of studies have emerged of parties and party systems in the region 
(Manning 2005, Mozaffar and Scarritt 2003, Kuenzi and Lambright 2001, Lindberg 
2007, Randall and Svåsand 2002, Basedau et al. 2007).  The literature has had the great 
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 virtue of being theoretically comparative, as scholars have sought to apply the theoretical 
lessons of the study of political parties in the mature democracies of the industrialized 
countries.   
 
It is the ambition of this paper to innovate in two ways.  First, we focus on opposition 
political parties.  There are remarkably few studies of opposition parties in contemporary 
Africa.  Studies on political parties have typically focused on the parties in power (eg. 
van de Walle 2003) on party systems (eg., Kuenzi and Lambright, Mozaffar et al. 2003, 
Randall and Svåsand 2002, Manning 2005), or on the general dynamics of electoral 
competition (eg. Basedau et al., 2007, Salih 2003).  Studies on the opposition in Africa 
since the recent wave of democratization have also tended to focus on the broader 
category of civil society (Olukoshi 1998), and have mostly ignored electoral competition 
and legislative politics.  
 
This neglect of opposition parties seems unfortunate.  For one thing, the ability of 
opposition parties to compete politically should be quite instructive of the level of 
democracy that is present in the political system.  Legislative dominance by one party 
over time is often associated with misuse of state resources and authoritarian tendencies. 
Electoral turnover and declining legislative dominance should therefore be considered 
positive for democratic competition and the institutionalization of democracy more 
generally. Second, the incentives and resources available to opposition parties are quite 
different than those available to the party in power.  Though this will clearly vary across 
the region, opposition parties are likely to have a much more circumscribed access to 
state resources, and, thus, it can be hypothesized, a lower ability to resort to patronage 
strategies. The implications of this for both party organization and programs and the 
institutionalization of the party system more generally are issues that have received 
surprisingly little attention in the scholarship on African parties.   
 
According to democratic theory, the presence of a stable and numerically viable 
opposition in the legislature is a key requisite for horizontal accountability, through 
legislative check on executive power. We could therefore assume that the ability of the 
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 opposition to win elections in large part is a function of the degree of democracy existing 
in the political system.  Based on this assumption, initially we hypothesized a positive 
correlation between the strength of democracy and the progress made on democratic 
consolidation, on the one hand, and the strength of opposition parties in the region. In 
fact, the data we describe below suggest a weak or even non-existent relationship. The 
weakness of opposition parties in Africa today is a striking characteristic of the multi-
party systems in the region, and correlates only weakly with the quality of democratic 
performance.  
 
Seeking to explain the weakness pf Africa’s opposition parties, we draw attention to the 
relationship between formal and informal political institutions in the region.  The impact 
of electoral rules and other formal institutions have been a favorite object of study in the 
current phase of research on political parties (Bogaards 2000, Reynolds 1999, Mozaffar 
et al. 2003).   Arguably, this turn to institutionalism has been a breath of fresh air for a 
region too often marked by the scholarly parochialism of African exceptionalism.  But 
there are at least two reasons to worry about this exclusive emphasis on formal 
institutions, and to call for a third phase of research on parties.  First, with the 
contemporary western experience as the theoretical referent, the literature has not tended 
to problematize the actual level of democracy in the political system.  Yet, in highly 
imperfect democracies, in which the regime has substantial incumbency advantages and 
is willing to resort to various shenanigans to retain power, formal political institutions are 
clearly at least in part the endogenous product of the balance of political power in the 
system.  As a result, in many African states, it is problematic to study the effects of 
formal institutions on political outcomes (Erdmann and Basedau 2007). 
 
Second, and as Helmke and Levitsky (2006) have usefully reminded us in a recent edited 
collection on Latin American politics, formal rules interact in a variety of ways with 
informal institutions in all political systems to mediate how the former shape political 
behavior and outcomes.  In some cases, informal political institutions like political 
clientelism undermine the formally specified political rules.  In others, the working of 
formal political institutions is facilitated or accommodated by a set of informal rules and 
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 conventions. According to the authors, competing informal institutions typically 
predominate in the new democracies, while complementing informal institutions 
normally prevail in the more established democracies. But as the Latin American case 
studies show, in emerging democracies informal institutions can have a positive effect on 
governance, especially in presidential systems with multiparty or fragmented party 
systems, and increase the likelihood of governability (Helmke and Levitsky 2006:11). If 
this is the case, then it is important to describe these informal political institutions and 
analyze their potential impact on the emergent African democracies.  In studies of Africa 
democratic developments, we have tended to associate non-democracy with informality 
and democracy with formal rules.  It is likely that as an electoral democracy matures, 
politics will depersonalize and give added weight to rule-based politics, in which formal 
political institutions will weigh more.  Nonetheless, it is important to emphasise that  
democracy will thrive in Africa only if political actors develop a set of informal norms, 
rules and standards that uphold, legitimize and strengthen the formal rules. The real test 
of democratic consolidation on the continent then is whether such complementary 
informal norms are emerging in party competition or whether competing informality 
largely undermines democratic developments. Such a project, neither detracts from the 
recognition of the importance of the region’s formal rules, nor need imply an argument 
about African exceptionalism.  
 
Linking informal and formal institutions in this manner is thus the second purpose of this 
paper. We do so through a focus on opposition parties, and on the factors that may 
explain the strength and weaknesses of opposition parties across the region in recent 
years.   We ask first, what factors explain the poor performance of the opposition in sub-
Saharan Africa. Second, on the basis of the emerging case-based literature on party 
systems in the region we turn to assess informal and formal institutional factors that may 
promise to enhance opposition parties’ viability and cohesion.  The paper is organized in 
the following manner. The next section presents our findings on opposition parties in sub-
Saharan Africa. Linking election statistics to Freedom House scores, we find little 
significant differences in the strength of the incumbent and the number of opposition 
parties represented in the legislature between polities with high and low political 
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 freedoms and civil rights. In section three, we explain these finding by drawing attention 
to a set of formal and informal institutional impediments to the development of 
opposition parties in the region. Turning in the fourth section to look for potentials for 
opposition party growth, we first discuss two formal rules that appear to facilitate 
complementary informality, the two term limitation for the presidential office and the two 
round presidential elections. We then assess various resource bases of opposition parties. 
A fifth section summarizes our findings. 
 
Opposition Parties in Africa Today 
A first cut at this issue is taken through some summary statistics of electoral results.  
Table 1 examines the number of parties winning seats, as well as the share of total votes 
and total seats won by the winning party and by the second biggest party, across each 
country’s first, second, third, fourth and in three cases, fifth elections.  It also tabulates 
Freedom House political freedom and civil liberties scores for each country, in the year 
that the election was held.  Finally, it calculates average “effective number of parties” 
scores for each election.  The table shows that some 21 countries had convened 4th 
elections between the end of 1989 and mid 2007, providing eloquent testimony to the 
routine nature of elections in Africa today.   
 
The winning party, more often than not an incumbent party, has continued to win 
handsome majorities of both votes and seats.  Some observers might note optimistically 
that the winning party’s margin has not increased over time.  Nor does it appear that the 
degree of disproportionality between votes and seats is growing over time, if we compare 
the first and second columns. It should, however, be noted that the percentage of votes 
going to the winning party includes a number of missing values; these tend to come from 
less democratic systems, so the data almost certainly understates the level of actual 
disproportionality.  On the other hand, given the region’s significant economic problems, 
the persistence of poverty and the poor performance of governments, it should be viewed 
as remarkable that incumbents have continued to do so well, and does probably indicate 
the advantages of incumbency, as the literature has tended to argue.    
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 In terms of the strength of the opposition, the most useful and least deceptive variable is 
probably the proportion of seats going to the opposition.  The “effective number of 
parties” statistic is often used instead, but the emergence of the independent candidate 
syndrome has lessened its usefulness over time.  In this case, the anomalous scores for 
fourth elections capture this phenomenon, which we discuss below.  In brief, it is hard to 
distinguish between small parties and independents, both of which appear to be 
expanding.  To cite just two examples:  In the Congo-k elections of 2006, for instance, 63 
independents are reported, as well as 56 parties with five or fewer seats (in a legislature 
of 500 deputies!).  In Mauritania, the winning party claims only 16% of the seats 
following the 2006 elections, but there are 41 independents, and so on. 
 
What, then, can be argued about these second parties?  They appear to have gained in 
strength over time, if just barely, from under a fifth of total seats allocated in the first two 
elections, to just over a quarter in fourth elections. Still, they remain relatively small, with 
only 22 of the 137 elections reaching a third of the legislative seats (in comparison, the 
majority party had 66 % of the seats in 68 elections).  
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 Table 1: Election Results, by number of election, 1989-2006 
  SEATS VOTES 
#OF 
PARTIES EFFECTIVE SEATS FREEDOM 
 N WINNING  WINNING WINNING # OF 2nd  HOUSE 
  PARTY (%) 
PARTY 
(%)  SEATS PARTIES 
PARTY 
(%) SCORE 
        
1st election 41 62.4 55.4 6.7 3 18.9 8.5 
        
2nd election 38 68 60.4 6.8 2.6 16.2 8.4 
        
3d Election 34 64.6 53.4 6.4 2.4 21.4 7.9 
        
4th Election 21 61.6 56.5 6.8 6.8 27.5 7.2 
        
5th elections 3 41.9 37 9 9 27.5 5 
        
 
Notes: 5th elections have been held in Benin, Niger, and Sao Tome.  These totals do not include 
elections in Botswana and Mauritius, the two countries in the region that regularly held 
competitive elections for at least a decade before 1989.  In Bicameral systems, the data concerns 
only the lower house.  
Source: Author’s data base of legislative elections  
 
 
Table 2 divides the same data by the Freedom House scores of the country in the year of 
the legislative election being held.  A first category of 34 elections concern the most 
democratic countries, categories as ‘Free’ by Freedom House.  The second set of 55 
elections is in the category characterized as hybrid regimes, mostly what Freedom House 
calls “partly free’. The third category of 34 elections has been conducted in the least 
democratic countries, according to the Freedom House score categories as ‘Not Free’.  As 
argued above, our initial expectation was that the opposition parties would do much 
better in the first category of countries, given the fact that political freedoms and civil 
rights are the highest.  In fact, we do find a weak correlation between the quality of the 
democracy and the strength of the opposition.  Still, we expected to find much sharper 
contrasts between the category, and the weakness of party oppositions in even the most 
democratic systems does appear striking.  
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 Table 2: Election Results by level of democracy 1989 - 2006 
 SEATS VOTES 
#OF 
PARTIES EFFECTIVE  SEATS FREEDOM  
HOUSE N WINNING  WINNING WINNING # OF 2nd  
 PARTY (%) PARTY (%) SEATS PARTIES PARTY (%) SCORE 
       
Under 6 34 58.5 53.1 5.9 2.7 25.6 
       
6 to 9 55 60 53 7.1 3.6 20.1 
       
10 and Above 44 73 62.2 6.1 2 15.2 
 
Notes:  The table does not include elections after 2006, because of non-availability of Freedom 
House scores for 2007.  Civil rights and political freedom scores have been added up.  Under 6 
correspond more or less to Freedom house’s “free” categories of countries. 
Source: Author’s data base of legislative elections 
 
 
The election statistics presented here correspond to findings by among others, Lindberg 
(2007) finding that of 21 electoral democracies in sub-Saharan Africa, 11 may be 
characterized as stable/institutionalizing- of these 11, eight are one party dominant, thus, 
stable party systems in Africa seem to mean stable one party dominance (Lindberg 2007: 
237). From a perspective of democratic accountability, this is problematic. As reported in 
much of the literature on political dominance in the region, dominance is very often 
associated with misuse of state resources and authoritarian tendencies (van de Walle 
2003, Manning 2005, Randall and Svåsand 2002). In other words, if the only political 
systems capable of providing mass patronage through their party system as 'electoral 
machines' are one party systems the question is whether multiparty democracy is really 
emerging in the region. In countries like Tanzania, Botswana, South Africa and 
Mozambique – all characterized as either stable or institutionalizing (Lindberg 2007) the 
dominant party has not been subjected to serious electoral contestation. The increasing 
degree of horizontal and vertical accountability observed in these regimes exists in the 
context of one dominant party that has not been subject to serious electoral challenge. 
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 Our statistical findings hide major exceptions and developments over time within a given 
country and the region. Nevertheless, looking at individual electoral results and countries, 
we are struck by at least three signs of opposition party weakness. 
 
The small size of opposition parties:   First, as suggested in Tables 1 and 2, the leading 
party of the opposition is often relatively small compared to the party of government. 
Even in the region’s most democratic countries, the opposition often has fewer than half 
the number of seats as the winning party: In Benin (2003), 15 seats compared to 31, for 
instance, in Cape Verde (2006) 29 compared to 41.  Since the majority party can often 
count on the legislative support of smaller non-government parties and independents, 
these data understate the strength of the majority party relative to the opposition.  
Moreover, it should be noted in this respect that most of these countries have presidential 
constitutions with wide discretionary powers for the executive, and no requirement that 
the parliamentary majority be the party of the president.  Yet, this has actually been the 
case in only a very small number of cases, most notably Niger and Sao Tome, in which 
successive presidents have not consistently been able to count on a stable parliamentary 
majority.   
 
The limited durability of the opposition: As argued by Randall and Svåsand (2002), 
functioning democracies require an institutionalized party system to the extent that voters 
are able to choose between alternative parties and that they should be able to pass a vote 
on the basis of the parties’ performance in previous elections. Underlining the weakness 
of African opposition parties, it is striking how many parties that changes from one 
election to the next.  Lindberg (2006: 13) has compiled the number of parties registered 
in legislative elections in 44 sub-Saharan Africa countries. While the number ranges from 
a low of seven (Botswana) to the 100 registered parties in Congo (DRC),  more than half 
of the multiparty democracies in the region are reported to have more than 15 registered 
parties in legislative elections. In only a handful African countries have the same parties 
– apart from the incumbent- contested all three (or four) elections since multiparty 
elections where reinstituted. In Zambia only the party that won the first multi-party 
elections in 1991, Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) has contested all four 
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 legislative elections since 1991. In the Gambia no parties have been represented in 
legislative elections in more than three elections. Even the relatively institutionalised 
multiparty system in Senegal has not produced a stable party system to the extent that the 
majority of the electorally significant parties are represented in consecutive elections.  
 
The independent candidate phenomenon: Arguably, throughout the region, political 
parties appear to dominate the political scene. Nevertheless, in Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Malawi, Madagascar and the recent Uganda multiparty elections, independent candidates 
have constituted more than 10 per cent of Members of Parliament. In the case of the 1998 
elections in Madagascar, independent candidates garnered a higher percentage of the vote 
(26. 8%) than the largest party1. In Uganda’s 2006 multiparty elections, independent 
candidates gained the same number of seats as the largest opposition party Forum for 
Democratic Change (FDC). With 20 % of the vote in the 2004 elections, independent 
candidates constituted the third largest group in the parliament of Malawi (Rakner et al. 
2007). These totals are of course hard to interpret comparatively. The voting behavior of 
independent legislators and their relationship to the majority vary both within and across 
legislatures.  While reflecting the election outcome, the numbers do not tell us much 
about the role of these independents in the legislature between elections. Candidates may 
be elected as independents, but eventually join the presidential majority and the 
difference between independents and parties represented by a single parliamentarian is 
not entirely clear.  
 
The large number of independents serves to weaken opposition parties and their ability to 
contest presidential power and this high number of independents reflects several distinct 
reasons to run as an independent.  First, a substantial number of candidates do not think 
that running as part of a party increases their chances of winning a seat. They choose to 
run on their own and count on their own prominence within the community and their own 
resources to win.  Second, a number of independents initially sought to stand as members 
of a party, but lost a primary, or were not chosen by the party to be a candidate.  They 
                                                 
1 The numbers are reported at http://africanelections.tripod.com/. For a recent account of democratic 
developments in Madagascar, see Marcus 2005. 
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 disagree with this decision, and choose to run as independents instead.  Noteably, the 
party that rejected them often appears unable to assert party discipline and convince the 
person not to run. Finally, and concurrently with both of these logics, the decision to run 
as an independent can be part of a strategy to negotiate one’s entrance into the winning 
party after the election, perhaps to buttress the presidential majority.  At least some 
independent candidates believe that winning on one’s own enhances the leverage to 
negotiate a good deal for one’s self after the election (Rakner et al. 2007). The case of 
Malawi shows that constitutional provisions (Section 65) intended to strengthen the role 
of parties by preventing MPs elected on a party ticket from changing party affiliation 
during the electoral term without having to re-contest their seat may have led to an 
increase in the number of independent candidates. MPs may leave their party group and 
declare themselves as ‘independent’, and MPs elected as ‘independents’ may join an 
existing party group2. Thus, standing as an independent provide individual MPs with 
incentives in terms of striking bargains with the main party.  
 
In sum, the scholarship on African political parties have increased markedly in the past 
decade and in particular and in particular, we now have a number of valuable case 
analyses of party systems in many of Africa’s emerging multiparty systems. 
Nevertheless, systematic knowledge of the party-legislative relations is still scarce and 
we know little of how opposition parties (and independents) vote in parliament and the 
level of horizontal accountability.  The numeric weakness of the opposition witnessed by 
the fact that even in Africa’s most institutionalized multiparty system the opposition 
rarely gain more than 20 per cent of the parliamentary seats, the limited durability of 
opposition parties and the unclear role of independents in parliament, however, suggest 
that many legislatures in the region perform a relatively weak function as a check on 
executive power. What may explain the continued weakness of opposition parties both in 
relatively institutionalized multiparty systems and the hybrid regimes? 
 
                                                 
2 Most of the independents elected in 2004 were previously in UDF but had defected during the nomination 
process for various reasons. After the election, most of them rejoined the UDF parliamentary group.   
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 Explaining the weakness of opposition parties 
The major debates on the relative merits of presidential versus parliamentary systems and 
the impact of electoral institutions that have marked much of the scholarship on 
democratization in Latin America have been somewhat less prevalent in studies of 
African multi party systems. Nevertheless, a number of studies have argued that the first-
past-the post-electoral system provide undue advantages to the incumbent because of the 
disproportionate number of seats/votes gained (Olokoshi 1998). Our findings suggests 
that for historical and largely context specific reasons, opposition parties are similarly 
poorly developed in the countries that have adopted list proportional representation (PR). 
While this clearly does not suggest that the formal rules, regulations and policies that 
structure political interaction do not matter for how individual and groups act politically, 
it suggests that the explanations for the outputs produced must be contextualized. Based 
on an analysis of a number of excellent case studies produced on party system 
development and electoral policies in sub-Saharan Africa over the past two decades, three 
challenges generally appear to affect opposition parties throughout the region: 
Incumbency advantages related to the dominance of the executive, limited access to 
resources, and the low legitimacy attached to the notion of opposition politics in the 
region. In keeping with Helmke and Levitsky’s (2006) notion of formal-informal 
institutional interlinkages, the dominance of the executive over the legislative office, the 
form of party finance available in the region, and the fact that the notion of a stable and 
loyal opposition generally is not accepted as a legitimate political phenomenon, may be 
considered as informality that largely competes with the formal rules of free and fair 
multiparty contestation.   
 
The concentration of power in the presidency: Across sub-Saharan Africa, the weak 
institutionalisation of the parties is linked to the political framework in which the 
presidency is overwhelmingly important. Parliamentary office and control of committee 
leadership remain poor bases for parties to promote their own policies. Furthermore, in 
many of the countries in the region, absence of regionally elected assemblies and weak 
local government structures imply that there are few alternative arenas where parties can  
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 groom prospective candidates or impact on the formulation or execution of public 
policies. Thus, the weakness of the parties, and in particular the opposition, is embedded 
in excessive power concentration in the political system.  
 
The case of Zambia illustrates how the combination of executive dominance and the 
FPTP electoral system discourages the opposition from entering into coalitions. Before 
the 2001 elections, in spite of repeated calls in the press for the opposition to unite, 
attempts to form a coalition behind one candidate failed, as no one would withdraw. As 
noted by Burnell “in Zambia many politicians like to conceive of themselves as the 
president of a political party and envisage being the next republican president, and threat 
parties as a personal vehicle to that end” (Burnell 2001: 245). The use of the executive 
office to maintain control over the legislature can be witnessed by recent developments in 
Malawi. Shortly after the 2004 election President Mutharika, resigned and formed a new 
party, the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party). The President then faced a parliament in 
which “his” party did not have a single representative, and with the largest party seeing 
him as an enemy. In order to secure control over parliament, the President has sought to 
limit the role of parliament by drastically reducing its sittings and has used cabinet 
positions as a survival instrument. As a result the number of cabinet positions –and 
related costs- has increased from 24 (2004) to 42 (June 2007) (Gloppen et al. 2007). The 
cumulative effect has been increased costs and the paralyzing of parliament. 
 
Access to resources:  As anyone who has ever visited a party office in an African country 
will attest to, parties are poor, characterized by few resources, poor organizational 
capacity and most often lack a structure that can penetrate the national territory. While 
parties in Eastern Europe and Latin America have developed party structures tied to 
functional interests in society, such as working class parties tied to trade unions, Christian 
parties linked to the Catholic churches, agricultural parties tied to farming interests, few 
such linkages between the party structure and interest groups can be found in Africa. 
Incumbent parties’ strength is very often explained by their access to public funds and 
their use of state instruments to their own advantage (Randall and Svåsand 2002, van de 
Walle 2003). Thus, the extent to which opposition politicians and parties can sustain 
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 themselves without access to central state resources is key to their ability to compete.  In 
countries where opposition parties have been weak, there is much evidence that party 
finance and the party’s ability to project itself throughout the territory have been a key 
issue (on the latter, in Togo see Toulabor 2005).  
 
Generally, party formation remains based on personal ambitions and ethnic differences 
rather than issues (Burnell 2001). The level of economic development in the region, 
coupled with weak private sectors, have meant that in many cases investing in a political 
career is the most realistic channel for upward mobility. Political positions are often the 
route to business opportunities (licences, contracts with the state and donors) has this may 
be a driving force in the fragmentation of the party system. The 2006 presidential and 
parliamentary elections in Uganda offer some insights to constraints facing opposition 
parties in the face of incumbency control of state resources (Kiiza et al. forthcoming). 
The incumbent greatly affected the election outcome from deciding on the procedure 
itself, making certain changes, implementing measures – through the election itself. The 
so-called Movement system remained in operation until 23 February 2006 elections 
which meant that the incumbent party was funded as a government entity through the 
2006 elections. The failure to ensure a distinction between the NRM-O and the state was 
witnessed through the use of public resources, public servants campaigning for the NRM-
O, lack of balance in media coverage, and the harassment of the main opposition 
candidate and his supporters. As a result, none of the opposition parties were able to 
challenge the hegemony of NRM in a fraction of the 945.351 seats contested at various 
levels of government in Uganda.   
 
The low legitimacy of legislative opposition: A third major challenge for the opposition 
parties concerns their legitimacy. In one manner or another, the legitimacy of the back 
bench is questioned in many African political systems, as the role of a legislative 
opposition is not yet widely accepted in the region.  Surveys like the Afrobarometer point 
to the relatively low esteem in which political parties are held, but interestingly, 
opposition parties are held in particularly low esteem (Afrobarometer, 2004). Piet 
Konings (2004: 305-6) argues convincingly, for instance, that the SDF in Cameroon lost 
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 popular legitimacy when it agreed to enter into parliamentary opposition, because many 
people, including some of its own rank and file, believed a party out of power could only 
participate in parliamentary processes in order to benefit from various perks and 
prebends.  Public financing for parties inevitably leads to accusations regarding the use of 
that money by party leaders, and participation in legislative politics result in accusations 
of compromise and lack of vision.  Notably, while the international donors finance as 
much as 50 per cent of the budget in many African countries, financial support to 
political parties has remained a marginal and controversial area of aid (Carothers 2006).  
 
We know relatively little about elite behavior and why politicians either stand as 
opposition or chose to join the government, but it is evident that the nature of 
representation in sub-Saharan Africa to a large degree favours the dominant party. A 
number of studies have emphasised that African politicians are expected to act as spoke 
persons and financial providers in their communities. Within this perspective, to be in 
opposition is of limited political value because politicians are expected to represent their 
constituencies, and representation is measured by their ability to provide resources. 
Opposition politicians therefore have limited incentives to coalesce because individual 
politicians are more likely to gain access to state resources if they associate with the 
president’s party (van de Walle 2007).  Burnell notes of Zambian politics that party 
formation is driven by political careerism, competition over spoils and personal traits 
rather than serious disagreements over ideology or program (2001).  Bierschenk makes 
much the same point concerning elections in Benin (2006).  The behavior of Malawian 
MPs suggests that when political finances are patronage based – sometimes being in 
opposition/or forming an opposition party is simply a bargaining chip that is used to get 
into position in the next round. Such behaviour offers some instructive insights and also 
to a large extent explains why politicians - and parliament as an institution - is held in 
low esteem by the population.  
 
In sum, limited resources, the nature and pervasiveness of executive dominance and the 
degree of opposition party legitimacy provide major impediments that may explain the 
weakness of the opposition parties in sub-Saharan Africa. Acknowledging the vast 
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 variation in terms of democratic institutionalisation in the African region and that the 
degree to which informal institutions provide outcomes that largely circumvent the 
formal institutions varies with the quality of democracy, we now turn to ask: To what 
extent can we detect emerging informal norms, rules and standards that appear to 
legitimize and strengthen the formal rules of multiparty contestation? Addressing the 
problems of resources, executive dominance and lack of opposition cohesion, we suggest 
that shifting forms of clientelism, and the institutional rules of term limits for the 
presidency and two-rounds of presidential elections offer some potential for the 
emergence of stable and viable opposition in the region. 
 
Potentials for the establishment of a viable opposition 
Given the factors described in the previous section, it is a wonder opposition candidates 
ever win elections.  On the whole, few of them do, but there has been some alternation 
across the region, and there is little doubt that parties in power can no longer simply 
assume electoral triumph.  How will the prospects for the opposition improve? In what 
kinds of circumstances will opposition forces be more likely to prevail?  This is clearly 
an area in which much more research, particularly at the individual country level, is 
necessary.  However, there are several institutional pointers which can be put forward, 
tentatively, based on the research that is available.  
 
The potential effects of term limits on one party dominance 
The third wave of democratization in the African region has so far only resulted in 
limited increase in actual political competition. Ishiyama and Quinn (2006) show that 
political parties that had been dominant in the period before democratization, typically in 
competitive single party regimes, were systematically more likely to emerge in power 
following democratization, though this was tempered by the number of political parties in 
the system and the degree of ethnic fractionalization.    
 
As part of the democratic transitions of the early 1990s, presidential term limits were 
introduced in most African countries as a response to the president-for-life situation that 
had been associated with the one-party state. Because of incumbency advantages, term 
 16
 limits provides the best chance to limit the accumulation of power in the hands of the 
executive. Second, it may be argued that term limits may break an electoral authoritarian 
regime’s decent into dictatorship (Maltz 2007). Perhaps more important in terms of the 
prospects for opposition parties, term limits promote the alternation of power both for 
individuals and political parties. This is because term limits entail the periodic exit of 
incumbent presidents and the successor must face the opposition who tend to fare better 
against successor candidates that the incumbent. Presidential term limits thus reduce 
incumbency advantages and improve the chances of political alternation in power. 
Ghana’s president Jerry Rawlings set a president in 2000 when he retired after two terms 
in office and his successor lost the elections (Nugent 2001). Similarly, in Mali, the 
constitutional limit on two presidential terms decreased the dominance of the party the 
ADEMA party that came to power in the 1992 elections as a result of internal rivalry. 
The legislative elections that followed produced a parliament divided among a number of 
parties and without a clear presidential majority (Villalón and Idrissa 2005: 51). The 2002 
elections in Kenya also broke the dominance of the Kenya African National Union 
(KANU) that had been in power since independence in 1963. President Moi had ruled 
since 1978. As part of a package of democratic reforms, the president agreed to term 
limits to the presidency in the early 1990s and under domestic and international pressure 
bowed to these limits in the 2002 elections. His successor candidate Uhuru Kenyatta won 
only 31 per cent of the vote and facing Kenyatta rather than Moi the opposition was able 
to stand behind one candidate than thereby break the one-party dominance that had 
prevailed since independence.   
 
Most Latin American republics instituted term limits in the 19th and early twentieth 
Century, apparently in an effort to limit presidential powers, in what were highly 
rpesidential and personallistic regimes (see Bienen and van de Walle, 1989).  This 
appears to have been one pragmatic solution to dealing with the “caudillo” tradition of 
the region. It was very hard to limit presidential perogratives while the president was in 
power, but it became part of the formal rules to set a clear limit on how long the president 
might stay in power.  It is conceivable that the same clear eyed pragmatism is developing 
in Africa’s imperfectly democratic systems today.  
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Two round presidential elections 
Certain kinds of electoral rules probably facilitate incumbency turn over (van de Walle, 
2005).  In particular, the defeats of incumbents in Benin and Senegal suggest that the two 
round majority system of presidential elections increases the chances of an opposition 
coalition forming to defeat an incumbent.  In both those countries, the vulnerability the 
incumbent demonstrated in the first round created the sense that an opposition coalition 
could win the election, which encouraged a movement of defection from the presidential 
camp to the opposition.  The brief period between the two rounds of voting facilitated 
deal-making to encourage this process along.  In these countries, a simple majority 
system would in each case probably have resulted in the plurality victory of the president 
over several opposition candidates.  
 
The potential of limiting incumbency advantages through shifting forms of clientelism 
and alternative resource bases 
In an earlier essay, one of us has noted that the democratization of politics in Africa is in 
the process of changing the nature of political clientelism in the region (van de Walle 
2007).   The introduction of greater rule of law, regular competitive elections and greater 
vertical accountability does not necessarily eliminate clientelism, since we can see that 
various practices of patronage, club good provision to key constituencies and influence 
peddling are all common features of the most respectable democracies of the OECD 
countries. Instead, it is hypothesized that first, democratization shifts the locus of 
clientelism from the central state apparatus to the political parties. Whereas the 
Presidency typically controls clientelism in the authoritarian regime, the exigencies of 
competitive elections may force incumbents to shift clientelist practices to the parties to 
help them compete for votes.  Secondly, it is hypothesized the movement to democratic 
politics increases the amount of redistribution that takes place thanks to clientelism.  The 
need to win elections may therefore result in an expansion of clientelism away from just a 
small minority of elites, which was more likely to be the case in the authoritarian regime.  
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 There are important caveats to this prediction. In Africa’s poor and stagnant economies, 
politically motivated spending and patronage possibilities are actually quite limited.  
Despite misconceptions to the contrary, African state structures are comparatively small 
and cheap (Goldsmith 2000).  Thus, the shift to electoral politics may create a need for 
expanding social services and patronage, but it does not by itself lessen the sharp fiscal 
constraints of governments that have never been very good at taxing their citizens and are 
relatively dependent on the donors. Nonetheless, and in comparison to the sleepy days of 
non-competitive single party elections and foreordained presidential referenda, the move 
to electoral politics certainly reinforces the importance of the party in power.  To win 
elections, the president needs to strengthen his party, both in order to maintain party 
discipline and to campaign effectively.  This process is not without its problems and there 
is plenty of evidence that incumbent parties have a hard time maintaining party discipline 
and are not necessarily able to campaign effectively all over the territory, notably in rural 
areas far from the capital.  Nonetheless, access to state resources, and to the infrastructure 
of the state through out the territory offers a huge advantage to the party in power, 
compared to opposition parties, which have neither. 
 
How do opposition parties address this weakness?  At least two patterns are starting to 
emerge.  One is the financing of parties by private business.  In Madagascar, for instance, 
Marc Ravalomanana used his own personal fortune as owner of the island’s biggest dairy 
company to finance his party and his own successful campaign for the presidency in 
2002.   In Benin, the winner of the presidential elections of March 2006, Yayi Boni had 
been president of the BOAD (the French acronym for the West African Development 
Bank, a development financial institution of the West African Monetary Union) for a 
decade before he ran for the Presidency.  The BOAD’s projects in Benin were broadly 
publicized in the months before the election to enhance his technocratic image and his 
ability to deliver the goods to the population. He also appears to have relied on the 
financial support of businessmen with whom he had had business relations while at the 
BOAD. (see Mayrargue 2006: 167-8). Morrison makes a similar argument about political 
candidates for election in Ghana where business men invest in candidates (Morrison 
2004).  
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A second pattern is for opposition parties to seek office at the subnational level as a 
platform from which to compete at the national level.  In Uganda, John Kizito Ssebaana, 
the head of the Democratic Party, has been Mayor of Kampala.  Nicephore Soglo, leader 
of the opposition in Benin, following his own presidential term in office between 1991 
and 1996, provides another example: He became mayor of Cotounou, the capital city, a 
base from which he has promoted his own son, now that his age excludes him from the 
Presidency. For an opposition party, control of a mayorality provides significant 
resources for one’s party faithful, as well as a core base of supporters, both of which are 
sure to prove very useful when the time comes to compete for national office.  Financial 
resources are only a part of the motivation. Ravalomanana’s entry into Malagasy politics 
was as mayor of the capital, Antananarivo.  In his case, the political resources afforded by 
such a position were probably more important than the financial resources.   
 
 
Concluding comments 
In this paper we have argued that the scholarship on democracy in Africa so far has paid 
insufficient attention to the nature of opposition parties. We have presented data showing 
the number of parties winning seats, the share of total votes and total seats won by the 
winning party and by the second biggest party, across each country’s first, second, third, 
fourth and in three cases, fifth elections. Correlating the election data to the Freedom 
House indicators on civic and political liberties, our data suggest a weak or even non-
existent relationship between level of democratic institutionalization and the size of 
opposition parties across the region. Arguably, cross national data are sensitive to the 
limited time series, and sometimes the sheer weakness of the data put in. Nevertheless, 
comparative and case analyses of sub-Saharan African elections confirm the weakness of 
opposition parties in Africa as a striking characteristic of the multi-party systems in the 
region. 
 
Our analysis of factors that may explain the weaknesses of opposition parties, have 
emphasized the links between informal and formal institutions. While it is clear that 
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 reversals to authoritarian forms of rule is proving less attractive to Africa leaders both for 
international and domestic reasons, our analysis of the role of opposition parties in the 
region suggest that we should perhaps question the assumption that Africa’s multiparty 
systems are progressing in any direction (Herbst 2001), or at least that the pace of 
progress is exceedingly slow.  Regardless of the nature and quality of electoral 
institutions, and electoral system, opposition parties have remained numerically weak and 
fragmented. As a result, an essential element of democratic accountability has not yet 
emerged. It is interesting, and perhaps not surprising to note that some of the most stable 
political regimes in the region, and also some of the regimes now rated as “most 
promising” from a developing aid perspective, are one-party dominant regimes who have 
not experienced regime turn-over. There are a number of reasons for questioning this 
tendency to favor stability over power alternation. For one thing, the prospects of future 
power alternation changes the incentives that key actors face. If the ruling party faces a 
real prospect of loosing power, it may be induced to create institutions that protect it 
when out of power, such as a strong independent judiciary. Studies of former communist 
countries also suggest that business tend to invest less in buying influence in countries 
with party alternation. Thus, there are strong empirical reasons to believe that power 
alternation will increase the quality of governance through strengthening both horizontal 
and vertical accountability mechanisms.  To emphasie the role of opposition, their role in 
the legislature and the formal and informal institutional mechanisms that may impede of 
opposition coalescing and alternatively enhance opposition, should therefore be 
emphasized.  
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